

INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

To the management of Electronic Certification Accreditation Council
Certification Authority ("ECAC")

Scope

We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on [ECAC Certification Authority management's assertion](#) that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan, throughout the period 2024-08-01 to 2025-02-28 for its CA Pakistan known as list of Root and Subordinate CAs in scope (see **Annex**), ECAC has:

(1) disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environment control practices in its:

- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Root Certification Authorities CP/CPS, version 2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Root Certification Authorities CP/CPS, version 2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, Certificate Policy \(CP\) for Trust Services Providers \(TSPs\), v2.1,](#) and
- [Pakistan National PKI, Certificate Policy \(CP\) for Trust Services Providers \(TSPs\), v2.0,](#)

(2) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

- ECAC provides its services in accordance with its Pakistan National PKI ECAC Certification Authorities CP/CPS,

(3) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

- the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles;
- it is enforced that subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ECAC); and
- subordinate CA certificate requests are accurate, authenticated, and approved

(4) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

- logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;
- the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.2.](#)

ECAC does not escrow its CA private keys and any subscriber private keys, and does not provide certificate renewal and suspension services. Accordingly, our assertion does not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

ECAC has renewed its Root CA and subordinate CA infrastructure in the audit period. The go live process was finished on 2025-02-28, and the new CA services are in place since 2025-02-28.

ECAC has not yet obtained insurance policy as a Government Organization as per the requirements specified in 9.2.1 of the [Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates](#), and in 9.2.1 of the [Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates](#), ECAC started the discussion of this matter with the relevant forums which is a time taking process.

Certification authority's responsibilities

ECAC's management is responsible for its assertion, including the fairness of its presentation, and the provision of its described services in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.2.](#)

Our independence and quality management

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the [Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants](#) issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which is founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behavior.

The firm applies International Standard on Quality Management (ISQM) 1, Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Practitioner's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our procedures. We conducted our procedures in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information*, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. This standard requires that we plan and perform our procedures to obtain reasonable assurance about whether, in all material respects, management's assertion is fairly stated, and, accordingly, included:

- (1) obtaining an understanding of ECAC's key and certificate lifecycle management business practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and confidentiality of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate lifecycle management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity;
- (2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate lifecycle management business practices;
- (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and
- (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion for the audit period for old PKI hierarchy (see **Old PKI Hierarchy**)¹.

The Audit Team consisted of 6 people including Audit Quality Reviewers. The team qualifications included CPA, PhD, CISA, CISM, CISSP and was led by Péter Máté Erdősi PhD CISA. The average years of auditing experience – auditing trust services or similar information systems – are 13 years in the audit team.

All team members have knowledge of

- (1) audit principles, practices and techniques,
- (2) the issues related to various areas of public key infrastructure of CAs information security including risk assessment/management, network security and physical security;
- (3) the applicable standards, publicly available specifications and regulatory requirements for CAs and other relevant publicly available specifications including standards for IT product evaluation; and
- (4) the WebTrust Audit processes.

Additional qualification and personal experience of the Lead Auditor, the Lead Auditor

- (1) has acted as auditor more than 45 complete trust service provider audits, including 17 WebTrust audits since 2000,
- (2) has adequate knowledge and attributes to manage the audit process, and
- (3) has the competence to communicate effectively, both orally and in writing.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ECAC and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations.

Inherent limitations

There are inherent limitations in the effectiveness of any system of internal control, including the possibility of human error and the circumvention of controls. For example, because of their nature, controls may not prevent, or detect unauthorised access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection to the future of any conclusions based on our findings is subject to the risk that controls may become ineffective.

Opinion

In our opinion, throughout the period 2024-08-01 to 2025-02-28, ECAC management's assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.2.](#)

¹ The Qualified Auditor notes that it is not applicable for the new PKI hierarchy yet, because it was operated for one calendar day during the audit period examined. (See **New PKI Hierarchy**.)

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ECAC's services beyond those covered by the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.2](#), nor the suitability of any of ECAC's services for any customer's intended purpose.

Use of the WebTrust seal

ECAC's use of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report, and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.

Crowe FST Audit Ltd.

Budapest, Hungary

2025-03-19



Anna Kőszegi
Partner



Péter Máté Erdősi PhD CISA
Director

Annex

Old PKI Hierarchy

Root CA

| Root CA | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 75F3520C33E0E4D4F3F36799B7DB1CF15F20B265 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 11:57:11 GMT |
| Not After | 2048-01-16 11:57:11 GMT |
| SKI | 3907EEE66F43BA389288B93173B690D671F7EDDE |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 4EC7B0E3257F710D2F2D90D3CF9E0C87ECF3D2CE59D724F9DDAE1C2485611324 |

Subordinate CAs

| ECAC Commercial Client Authentication CA G1 | |
|---|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Commercial Client Authentication CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 49333F5787900990DF0C4C1545B8515EF13AB224 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:18:19 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:18:19 GMT |
| SKI | A80C6E808FEFF71D83FBDF0C26592B24AEF67311 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 094C6668F247B148AAC26DEF75ECBB351A08BACA2156401B08FCF62D49EDAFC6 |

| ECAC Commercial Code Signing CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Commercial Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 5AC2DA6E334A70FFDDEC6A24C857F95E9F939482 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |

| ECAC Commercial Code Signing CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| SKI | F09FB73D45E4951CB950E2F2A3FB9348A7605E9B |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 304475CD3886E9F89FA4ACCDFA721FF3A46380164E06D6B30BC780848D677825 |

| ECAC Commercial SMIME CA G1 | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Commercial SMIME CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 2A1FA8CC3E6BDEB25D4743425EEC04C5945B3726 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:31:38 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:31:38 GMT |
| SKI | A2C0795DD151AA2EA56B5F3E79D900241E38A469 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 153A825CDCFBF89157AE6DF13FC1045D405E7257C8979F35A612322B2232D6B1 |

| ECAC Commercial Timestamping CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Commercial Timestamping CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 59992794C79053A9E7FA788767A42E7B5B71B005 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:27:07 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:27:07 GMT |
| SKI | F36BCDFB5E5E2193A51903C8E3EAF396DA942304 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 8D2FEC8E06B5F85D00ACE69E3A45BB2B9F52C58B3922C34749660E71D374ED24 |

| ECAC Commercial TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Commercial TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 2C54F22077FA7E28191234F38DE01799DA79346C |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:24:23 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:24:23 GMT |
| SKI | 9E0A1D5E38A20DC7AC34C9E022082D5DB5CE21EE |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 8992E142128A9C22BCE74FC48F6BFB46FBBF5CC0604C7DC213323036AFAAC502 |

| ECAC Government Client Authentication CA G1 | |
|---|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Government Client Authentication CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3FD0E0EA61B72BDD2599163127015ADD0E0C37B6 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:13:52 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:13:52 GMT |
| SKI | 5E655DBCD819671660511E3BEFCDCA1895F90D57 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 33F5587821962FEE27D17A10FBD133C12A895374ECF565925F63633442DB71D2 |

| ECAC Government Code Signing CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Government Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3D7958777463C7486C818F88F370553CD5716998 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:28:56 GMT |

| ECAC Government Code Signing CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:28:56 GMT |
| SKI | F9DB1C60182DD16DAA25B919D8E3CE41BB4DCB1C |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 29F0E39869B6DDBC269623EDCC453F764E026559A0B238A0BADC5F27743D1931 |

| ECAC Government SMIME CA G1 | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Government SMIME CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 50716918A1FFB95858E090D039BE0A5C33A9E62E |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| SKI | 07ED94DD1A3667CDC73D32B687C1F991128CC73D |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 2371A3686D2A1BAEC08E560755DB7BE9424408023DD5BB995C0211E0059818DE |

| ECAC Government Timestamping CA G1 | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Government Timestamping CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 30ACF22688DDB7ACB4290F27DF5A41EDFB2BC02F |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:26:16 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:26:16GMT |
| SKI | F4436E13DB3BA44CA25E4D45134EC878B11D5A12 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 1CBF424FFABEB601E8210B12A7BDB9C211DB96B798FE879945F57EE704D291A1 |

| ECAC Government TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Government TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |

| ECAC Government TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Serial | 55763E2DCF7C02DD776C551D79DC8F1BE0047E8F |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 bit |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2023-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| Not After | 2040-01-16 13:29:34 GMT |
| SKI | FF52146C41472EA47326FDDFEF26444A42832B95 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 8B32E9E5F919BD7449099E439F149829ABB1830C88E079E8AD26D11BB0D0DAD0 |

New PKI Hierarchy

Root CAs

| ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1 | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 168B224C2D69A9110A99CEF71880D223 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-08 12:02:01 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2040-01-08 12:02:01 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 12F82F5067FD5B2D989DA1C6AEE3CDB08CE965DD |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 2D91AC5C7D799A7F45EB926AA3EAE98014E00FC2EE10264FFE34FE5E56855C08 |

| ECAC TLS Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 4DA71C129CAE6AD72318CD7E43FF218D |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-08 12:02:47 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2040-01-08 12:02:47 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | A8ADEAB139265E8E2F5986FF77891BA2261826E1 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 1601DC334704BD853062D6DEBFEECAB38D496F515E186DA56175D9CA6F27256C |

| ECAC TSA Root CA G1 | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 7DBFF79425972B16B873B58E61B0ED09 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-08 12:03:38 UTC+00:00 |

| ECAC TSA Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Not After | 2040-01-08 12:03:38 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 204549EF620BF4B335F3C3D2810772F57DD0B2B5 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | A51E11DA5843D04B1D666CD19DE3542075A1877062216CC956CEC519DAFE87A9 |

| ECAC SMIME Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 704A05D98F89436489094AB5B6C497C7 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-08 11:49:40 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2040-01-08 11:49:40 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 2E75E3FC52FFA5FAD553FA80D2EBC8DF3FC5C8A6 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | D4E2F21AB0DF3F0456E29A0F3405FA3798F2152E8CD09EDF3BC4ABC28C70951C |

| ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3B25EC00DD7E8BBAE7339BCAE8D9B37E |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-08 12:17:42 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2040-01-08 12:17:42 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 9CB839F623977635A737BF3FB30DCB50C0A68009 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 9C9089E0D0C9B17149056A97EAA276E2CA7ED0DC515C65D45D2C6DCE98498220 |

Subordinate CAs

| ECAC TSA CA G1 | |
|----------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TSA CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 76C0F738722476653C83EDC9D903503C |

| ECAC TSA CA G1 | |
|--------------------|--|
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:51:54 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:51:54 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 557B13621C63482CB52EDAE4E5376C822BC36830 |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | Time Stamping |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 8B83BC2EA517F95833578F1150EC4A6D08C16B91C851B4D7C936A4B4118BD837 |

| ECAC OV TLS CA G1 | |
|--------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC OV TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 788B6ECD9DE1FD5C144CD3306CC35CE4 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:42:31 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:42:31 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 22051A9D7B31E41851FAE8AB683A8951FE9E0237 |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 1C26939AD9A91D707FD040E5A3800E4D010F9E36886F50CDE69B8CF10BAD49DC |

| ECAC EV TLS CA G1 | |
|-------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC EV TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3EE6FD16786350240FCDD9264A5C2860 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |

| ECAC EV TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:49:35 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:49:35 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | B1B5E9C96EBA670E3C074DD9A1305EFACCA1A23B |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0DE235DA20A086CFADC331A299D550FB2FBD2DE5EF1E37EA663713DD695C80C0 |

| ECAC Code Signing CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 02BCB8A47224721E344F1A4442C346F8 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:47:58 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:47:58 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 9E09A89FAC3E5CED166E655F2740DA81C008F914 |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | Code Signing |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0030073BA908DC7AFB7974045DC36EAFB628D3FD586EE6AE67B43B2D5791EDA1 |

| ECAC EV Code Signing CA G1 | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC EV Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 2559F010B5756CE2D4BB5B628A510FD1 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:50:01 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:50:01 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 23F818510E1BA26A25B2FE8A0AD536F0B754AE2E |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |

| ECAC EV Code Signing CA G1 | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Extended Key Usage | Code Signing |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0AD4CDD66EB6F0377A004CA6B71181064116B4076D9C0AD369C22F64F72F7EB9 |

| ECAC SMIME CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC SMIME CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 422284FB654D1EBA84F686CECA1337EC |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:48:39 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:48:39 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | 02EC35B351B8368B0492CFF2D84736C94B50BF98 |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | E-mail Protection |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 109DF302264CFE8E944306D05272ED80F4B37BED57CD149EC8D1FC9403A3F9FF |

| ECAC Client Authentication CA G1 | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Client Authentication CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 17D48AF7A23A0943FAD59DC63F92E237 |
| Key Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 4096 |
| Digest Algorithm | SHA256 |
| Not Before | 2025-01-09 11:48:17 UTC+00:00 |
| Not After | 2031-01-09 11:48:17 UTC+00:00 |
| SKI | CF9B98919CEF300CCB52793B419743E4D0C51B9B |
| Key Usage | Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Extended Key Usage | TLS Web Client Authentication |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | E8C993FCFB2C2382BE411839D38EF48CB017965BD04CEDC20D42585367ABB1B4 |



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19 March, 2025

Electronic Certification Accreditation Council MANAGEMENT'S ASSERTION

Electronic Certification Accreditation Council Certification Authority ("ECAC") is operated by Electronic Certification Accreditation Council, Pakistan known as list of Root and Subordinate CAs in scope (see **Appendix A**), and provides the following CA services

- Subscriber registration
- Certificate rekey
- Certificate issuance
- Certificate distribution
- Certificate revocation
- Certificate validation
- Subscriber key generation and management
- Subordinate CA [cross-]certification

The management of ECAC is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA operations, including its CA business practices disclosure on its [website](#), CA business practices management, CA environmental controls, CA key lifecycle management controls, certificate lifecycle management controls, and subordinate CA certificate lifecycle management controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies identified.

There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error, and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can only provide reasonable assurance with respect to ECAC Certification Authority operations. Furthermore, because of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.

ECAC management has assessed its disclosures of its certificate practices and controls over its CA services. Based on that assessment, in ECAC management's opinion, in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan, throughout the period 2024-08-01 to 2025-02-28, ECAC has

(1) disclosed its business, key lifecycle management, certificate lifecycle management, and CA environment control practices in the following documents

- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Root Certification Authorities CP/CPS, version 2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Root Certification Authorities CP/CPS, version 2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Client Authentication Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.2,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Code Signing Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)



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- [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC S/MIME Subordinate CA Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.0,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.1,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC TLS Subordinate CAs Certificate Practice Statement, v2.2,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.0,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.1,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, ECAC Timestamping CA Certificate Practice Statement, version 2.2,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, Certificate Policy \(CP\) for Trust Services Providers \(TSPs\), v2.1,](#)
 - [Pakistan National PKI, Certificate Policy \(CP\) for Trust Services Providers \(TSPs\), v2.0,](#)
- (2) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- ECAC's Certification Practice Statements are consistent with its Certificate Policies,
 - ECAC provides its services in accordance with its Certificate Policy(ies) (if applicable) and Certification Practice Statement(s)
- (3) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that
- the integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles,
 - the integrity of subscriber keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles,
 - subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ECAC), and
 - subordinate CA certificate requests are accurate, authenticated, and approved,
- (4) maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that
- logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals,
 - the continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained, and
 - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in accordance with the [WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2.2](#), including the following

CA Business Practices Disclosure

- Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
- Certificate Policy (CP)

CA Business Practices Management

- Certificate Policy Management
- Certification Practice Statement Management
- CP and CPS Consistency

CA Environmental Controls

- Security Management



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- Asset Classification and Management
- Personnel Security
- Physical & Environmental Security
- Operations Management
- System Access Management
- System Development and Maintenance
- Business Continuity Management
- Monitoring and Compliance
- Audit Logging

CA Key Lifecycle Management Controls

- CA Key Generation
- CA Key Storage, Backup, and Recovery
- CA Public Key Distribution
- CA Key Usage
- CA Key Archival and Destruction
- CA Key Compromise
- CA Cryptographic Hardware Lifecycle Management

Subscriber Key Lifecycle Management Controls

- CA-Provided Subscriber Key Generation Services
- CA-Provided Subscriber Key Storage and Recovery Services
- Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Lifecycle Management
- Requirements for Subscriber Key Management

Certificate Lifecycle Management Controls

- Subscriber Registration
- Certificate Rekey
- Certificate Issuance
- Certificate Distribution
- Certificate Revocation
- Certificate Validation

Subordinate CA Certificate Lifecycle Management Controls

- Subordinate CA Certificate Lifecycle Management



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ECAC does not escrow its CA private keys and any subscriber private keys, and does not provide certificate renewal and suspension services. Accordingly, our assertion does not extend to controls that would address those criteria.

ECAC has renewed its Root CA and subordinate CA infrastructure in the audit period. The go live process was finished on 2025-02-28, and the new CA services are in place since 2025-02-28.

ECAC has not yet obtained insurance policy as a Government Organization as per the requirements specified in 9.2.1 of the [Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates](#), and in 9.2.1 of the [Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates](#), ECAC started the discussion of this matter with the relevant forums which is a time taking process. Based on the ECAC decision made on the Policy Management Authority meeting # 21 as of 2024-11-28, ECAC has suspended the issuance of all types of the EV certificates after the go live process has been finished until this matter is resolved.

Abdul Wahid Khan
ECAC PMA Head
March 19, 2025



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Appendix A

Root CAs

| ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1 | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 168B224C2D69A9110A99CEF71880D223 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 2D91AC5C7D799A7F45EB926AA3EAE98014E00FC2EE10264FFE34FE5E56855C08 |

| ECAC TLS Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 4DA71C129CAE6AD72318CD7E43FF218D |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 1601DC334704BD853062D6DEBFEECAB38D496F515E186DA56175D9CA6F27256C |

| ECAC TSA Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 7DBFF79425972B16B873B58E61B0ED09 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | A51E11DA5843D04B1D666CD19DE3542075A1877062216CC956CEC519DAFE87A9 |



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| ECAC SMIME Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 704A05D98F89436489094AB5B6C497C7 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | D4E2F21AB0DF3F0456E29A0F3405FA3798F2152E8CD09EDF3BC4ABC28C70951C |

| ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1 | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3B25EC00DD7E8BBAE7339BCAE8D9B37E |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 9C9089E0D0C9B17149056A97EAA276E2CA7ED0DC515C65D45D2C6DCE98498220 |

Subordinate CAs

| ECAC TSA CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC TSA CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TSA Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 76C0F738722476653C83EDC9D903503C |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 8B83BC2EA517F95833578F1150EC4A6D08C16B91C851B4D7C936A4B4118BD837 |



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| ECAC OV TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC OV TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 788B6ECD9DE1FD5C144CD3306CC35CE4 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 1C26939AD9A91D707FD040E5A3800E4D010F9E36886F50CDE69B8CF10BAD49DC |

| ECAC EV TLS CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC EV TLS CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC TLS Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 3EE6FD16786350240FCDD9264A5C2860 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0DE235DA20A086CFADC331A299D550FB2FBD2DE5EF1E37EA663713DD695C80C0 |

| ECAC Code Signing CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 02BCB8A47224721E344F1A4442C346F8 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0030073BA908DC7AFB7974045DC36EAFB628D3FD586EE6AE67B43B2D5791EDA1 |



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| ECAC EV Code Signing CA G1 | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Subject | CN=ECAC EV Code Signing CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Code Signing Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 2559F010B5756CE2D4BB5B628A510FD1 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 0AD4CDD66EB6F0377A004CA6B71181064116B4076D9C0AD369C22F64F72F7EB9 |

| ECAC SMIME CA G1 | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC SMIME CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC SMIME Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 422284FB654D1EBA84F686CECA1337EC |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | 109DF302264CFE8E944306D05272ED80F4B37BED57CD149EC8D1FC9403A3F9FF |

| ECAC Client Authentication CA G1 | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Subject | CN=ECAC Client Authentication CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Issuer | CN=ECAC Client Authentication Root CA G1,O=Electronic Certification Accreditation Council,C=PK |
| Serial | 17D48AF7A23A0943FAD59DC63F92E237 |
| SHA256 Fingerprint | E8C993FCFB2C2382BE411839D38EF48CB017965BD04CEDC20D42585367ABB1B4 |